Singapore’s Shame (Chapter 2 - A Culture of Fear)
By Dr James Gomez, Author, Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame
Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame (2nd Edition) is an updated version of the original book written by Dr James Gomez in 1999. In James Gomez’s view, the time has come to re-look at the strategy of generating increased political advocacy in Singapore, and in this context, to ask what is the status of self-censorship in Singapore — has it decreased, or evolved into something else? Dr James Gomez is of the view that self-censorship remains alive in Singapore’s political landscape, in mainstream society, in academia, and even in certain Opposition parties. He is currently working on the 2nd Edition of his original book based on feedback and input, and will be pondering on what’s next for civil society and Opposition politics.
CHAPTER 2: A Culture of Fear
When it comes to discussions of political culture a commonly used phrase is the “culture of fear”. In Singapore, a culture of fear is seen as driving self-censorship. This culture of fear is something that has been constructed by the PAP government through its historical tightening of political controls in spite of its occasional rhetoric of openness. This deliberately manufactured fear is aimed at securing social and political control over citizens and foreign residents in Singapore. It is the reason why people become anxious about political participation and justify self-censorship because a culture of fear exisits. How has this fear been created in Singapore?
The culture of fear is related to political development in Singapore. Discussions on the political development in the city-state have been reviewed from a number of perspectives over the last three decades. One writer attributed this political conservatism to the ideological hegemony of the ruling party and to Asian values (Chua, 1996). While another argued that the economy of Singapore was used to as tool of social control and to nurture political conservatism in the republic (Tremewan, 1994).
Others have suggested that the character of the middle class has something to do with this state of affairs (Rodan, 1992; Jones and Brown, 1994). The tactics of the PAP and its authoritarian character have also been identified as having explanatory potential (Rodan, 1993). Much earlier, local political scientist Chan Heng Chee had explained conservatism as a result of “politics” being absorbed into the state bureaucracy (Chan, 1975).
Former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew’s political style, together with his use of legal action at the courts, have also been proffered as contributing to the state of political conservatism here (Haas, 1999; Seow, 1994 and 1998; Selvam, 1991; Minchin, 1986). However, the centrality of Lee’s role in Singapore politics is now being challenged on several fronts. For instance, one book that tries to map the contributions of his other colleagues (Lam and Tan, 1999) while others include political autobiographies such as that of Said Zahari (2001 and 2007) which collectively challenge the centrality of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore`s political history.
The contemporary structures of changes in Singapore have also been identified as shaping political conservatism in Singapore. Analyses have focused on the strategies of the PAP, the institutional restrictions against independent political expression and the reforms that have taken place to “accommodate” the demand for greater political participation (Heng, 1997; Rodan, 1997; and Lam, 1997) as well as restrictions place over the internet, political films and public protests.
Issues concerning elections have also been considered relevant to the local political culture. One writer has provided an overall description of the Singapore electoral system and the accompanying changes over the years (Thio, 1997) while another has focused on the failure of the electoral system in representing alternative voices (Rodan, 1996). There are also several local academics have sought to explain the general and other elections in Singapore (Mutalib, 1992 and 1993; Singh, 1992; da Cunha, 1997). In my own PhD thesis on the impact of the internet on the electoral system, I concluded that political culture contributed in part to upholding the electoral system in Singapore that continuously returns the PAP into power (Gomez 2008).
Some works on civil society, mainly emanating from PAP government think-tanks, seek to make a distinction between civil and political society (Ooi and Goh, 1999). Others claim that civil society will be the site of future political contestation (Tay, 1998). Implicit in local discussions on civil society is that “neutral” or “non-partisan” political culture of such groups is the preferred choice.
There are only a few studies that have directly commented on political culture and behaviour in Singapore. Most works on the Republic’s political development, if they refer to political behaviour, use the term “political culture” (Soin Tan, 1993; Khong, 1995; Jeyaretnam, 1997), though it is not adequately explained, described or gauged. Often, it is mentioned in passing, without any depth of deliberation. Most discussions on self-censorship have often been used in relation to the media and local media in particular. The application of the concept self-censorship has only been used in a limited way to explain Singaporean political culture. Almost none discuss its role in a post-internet environment in Singapore.
Discussion on domestic political culture often go back to the features of traditional heritage, religion, political history of the region and ethnic origins of the migrant population in Singapore. Conventional explanations often state that the nature of political conservatism on the island can be attributed to ethnic culture. Understood in rigid ethnic categories, Singapore is made up of 75% Chinese, 14% Malay, 6% Indians and 5% Others. However, such categories are increasingly becoming irrelevant as more foreigners from non-traditional sources of immigration countries such as the Burma, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhere settle and work in Singapore.
One piece of work that attempted an ethnic explanation was an early study, which focused on the Chinese community (Clammer, 1985). The writer argued that their large numbers in Singapore sinicised the political culture of the Republic. Hence, the disdain that the Chinese hold for politics is reflected across the board in Singapore, he said. The writer pointed out that the majority Chinese, as opposed to the minorities, are politically conservative. He believed that this was one reason why political development in Singapore has largely mirrored the cultural conservatism of the ethnic majority. He offered as reasons, the social structure and attitudes of the Chinese community towards politics.
The PAP government has been able to manipulate and stretch this cultural argument to all ethnic communities in Singapore, in the 1990s, to sell the idea of an “Asian values” system, which tries to render democracy as a culturally Western-style alien concept. Modeled after Confucianism, Asian values instead are said to entail a belief in good government by honest men and includes a reverence for authority. As such, direct opposition is not to be encouraged; instead, consensus building is to be supported. While, arguments from ethnicity can hold some explanatory relevance, the uncritical use of ethnic explanations for political behaviour, needs to be guarded against. For instance, it is important to recognise that Singapore`s minority communities in the broad sense of the word are generally not involved in politics. In political parties, especially opposition parties, ethnic minority community participation is small, token or non-existent. Minority communities in Singapore have essentially abandoned politics and live their daily lives as a community unto themselves.
Often the plural ethno-religious make up of the city-state is used to pre-empt political change. Pictures of ethnic strife drawn from two early riots in the Republic’s history have been well utilised in government discourse to help the citizens and foreign residents to internalise risk aversive behaviour when it comes to politics. On the basis of frailties of statehood and a narrow range of policy instruments available for ethno-centered policies, the use of culture in this way aids the retention of the existing system. The argument from ethnic culture attempts to paint alternative views as dangerous, anti-establishment, unreflective of aspirations of the majority and as “fringe” interests. In this way, it perpetuates popular attempts to endanger and marginalise alternative views. For instance, demands for political space are often represented as the wants of minorities. The demand for political space is frequently depicted as a concern only of ethnic minorities, the English-educated, sexual minorities, academics and eccentric elements of society. Additionally, the push for liberal values and democracy is portrayed as the demand by a small group of people who use such ‘romantic’ notions as a strategy to gain political attention.
But the explanation via ethnicity does not clarify why political participation in other East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan is large and highly impassioned. Further, it does not explain why a very disparately constituted group of Chinese-educated, blue-collared workers and the man in the street elbowed for political space some 40 years ago in the Republic. There is nothing inherent in Asian cultures that make self-censoring a necessary feature. Instead, much of the promotion of group solidarity and the rejection of self-assertion and individual rights are systemic of Asian one-party dominated regimes or military dictatorships such as in Burma, China, Laos, Vietnam and even Japan. Thus, there is a need to go beyond ethnic culture to look at structures to explain the political culture that is uniquely Singaporean, cutting across ethnic lines and affecting even those of other nationalities residing in the Republic. There is something deeper than ethnicity that explains the state of political culture and fear in Singapore.
Economics has also been used to explain local political behaviour. Linked to the presence of a patron-client relationship between the PAP and the majority of the voters, the economic success of the republic is said to have created gratitude, loyalty and dependency among citizens and foreigners residing in Singapore for the ruling party. The fact is the PAP government is literally the largest employer in terms of percentage of total jobs in the economy. This position as the lead employer includes the number of government jobs (not just civil service, but includes all quasi-government and non-government entities that receive government funds or come under some form of government control). Add to this the percentage of total value of the stock market under state control (through Temasek, Government Investment Corporation, etc) versus that which is in truly private hands (bearing in mind that a lot of ‘private’ owners are active participants in the patronage system). Work in also the size of small and medium enterprises versus the size of MNCs and PAP government controlled businesses (Singapore Airlines, SingTel, etc) and this shows the link between the level of self-censorship how much the PAP government controls the livelihood of its citizens and foreign workers. Most people are not willing to do something to jeopardize their career or livelihood. The connection of the Republic’s economic success to the PAP is manifested in the way individuals and groups preface remarks about politics, especially their desire for greater political participation, with accolades for the ruling party and its leaders that is at the same time coupled with expressions of gratitude and loyalty. It is a ritual that is clearly observable at local conferences, meetings and speeches at events.
The political behaviour of the middle-class is highly relevant in any study of the nation’s economic culture. Based on it; size, some commentators note that middle-class behaviour represents the political culture of Singaporean society. They argue that the republic’s large middle-class, whose material consumption is linked to the state, does not want to upset the status quo. This special dependency is in part supported by the people’s obsession with material gain. Since citizens and foreign workers alike in Singapore are motivated by the need to constantly gather material advantage and get ahead, a national trait referred to locally as kiasuism is seen as an intrinsic character of this middle class. The ruling party taps this deep-seated desire of the people for materialism and therefore continually plays the economic card for its political ends. Feelings of anxiety and uncertainty displayed by the economically dependent middle class’ whenever the ruling party raises the spectre of economic downfall have been linked to the slow rate of the democratisation process in Singapore (Jones and Brown, 1994).
Even though some have endeavoured to show that the middle class itself is complex (Chua and Tan, 1995), economic dependency has been accepted as one explanation why the Singapore middle-class does not initiate political change. One writer speaks in terms of an ideological consensus between the PAP government and the electorate that has been based on a shared interest in economic growth (Chua, 1998). In 2008 when the mini-bond issues broke out in Singapore following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the initial crowds that gathered at the Speakers Corner eventually dissipated without building on the momentum for mass political action.
But the similarity between the political culture of the elite class and the masses, arising out of a centralised and punitive political system, goes beyond economics and the citizenry. This phenomenon has also affected the behaviour of foreign residents in the Republic and other foreigners who have dealings with the country. Those who do not publicly subscribe to this larger political culture or have actively taken part in what is seen as antagonistic political activity have been deported or their resident, work or student permits terminated or not renewed. This larger impact of political culture reveals lacunae in theories of democratisation that expected a course of political action from the middle-class.
Another account of political conservatism in the Republic focuses on the popular fear that the PAP will persecute any independent political expression. This fear originates from the perception that the government takes punitive action against its political opponents. In Singapore, there have been numerous examples of individuals who have challenged the political leaders of the country and suffered from detention without trial or have had defamation, bankruptcy and tax evasion suits filed against them. The challengers’ names and characters have been subjected to negative campaigning through a compliant local press. Such examples of negative campaigning of civil society activists and various opposition politicians in the past and present stay vivid in the minds of the people and perpetuate the fear. Memories lead opposition figures subjected to negative campaigning include Chia Thye Poh, Tan Wah Piow, JB Jeyaretnam, Francis Seow, Chee Soon Juan, and in 2006 when I contested the general elections against the PAP, I joined the ranks of these figures.
Fear is also due to the presence of the Internal Security Department (ISD) and its surveillance of political activities. The ISD makes its surveillance activities fairly visible, especially during opposition party activities or when political figures meet members of foreign embassies, overseas opposition politicians and civil society actors. The surveillance also covers religious activities, academic, social and theatre gatherings. Tertiary institutions such as polytechnics and universities are also monitored by handlers through student and academic informers. The public can get a fairly detailed account of the workings of the ISD, and its detention and interrogation techniques from Francis Seow’s book To Catch a Tartor: Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew’s Prison (Seow, 1994), supplementary information can also be found in (Tan, Gomez, 1999) and ( Hong 2009; Tan, Teo and Koh 2009).
There is also an informal culture of curiosity over each others` perceived political activity and the accompanying rumour mongering that acts as a mass surveillance device that feeds the formal surveillance network. The fear against surveillance is so widespread that presence of the ISD is evoked even when lay people speak of politics, make telephone calls or send messages via the Internet or post articles on blogs. With the arrival of the internet, there is a perception and acceptance that internet content is constantly being monitored by the authorities. Further, online anonymity that features prominently in internet chat rooms and in the comment sections of blogs is accepted as non-existent. The belief is that the PAP government and its agents have the technical and financial means to track every single anonymous online entity and that “radical” bloggers are invited out for a chat by government agents and persuaded to moderate their stance! Adding to this, are revelations that a Singapore-based company has supplied sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment to Burma’s military-rulers that is capable of intercepting all sorts of telephone and fax messages as well as e-mail and radio communications aggravates the situation even further (2nd September, Far Eastern Economic Review 1999).
Fear has also been attributed to an underlying apprehension that the vote is not secret, that voting against the ruling party could have a negative impact on voters’ livelihood, or that any alternative political views that individuals may have might be held against them. This mind-set is prevalent among many civil servants, employees in government-linked companies, and those who see themselves as being in one way or another connected to the state for their livelihood in Singapore. Being the largest employer and financial patron on the island, the PAP government has a psychological influence over the way a significant number of the people vote during elections. In 1997, the direct threats to withhold funding for precincts voting against the PAP had an immediate influence on voter behaviour (da Cuhna, 1997). In the last two general elections in 2001 and 2006, the PAP has turned to giving cash incentives such as Singapore Shares and other cash rebates to appeal to voter materialism.
Perceptions of a whole network of informal pressures that pulsate through the state machinery also contribute to fear. This is believed to take the form of “advice” and “pressure” put on civil servants or those in employment outside the civil service but who are nonetheless susceptible to pressure in having their actions deterred or curtailed. A frequently cited example is that immediate superiors advise their junior workers on the wisdom of engaging in particular political activities or associating with certain individuals and their causes. Failing to adhere to such advice is viewed as courting risk in losing one’s job, being demoted, being passed over for promotion or transferred to lesser departments in the organisation.
It is easy to agree that fear caused by perceptions of the surveillance and intimidation activities of the ISD, the wrath of the service machinery plus informal government pressures can be a powerful deterrent to alternative political activity and thought. However, ethnicity, economics and fear offered as individual explanations of a typically Singaporean political culture are not satisfactory. They do not demonstrate clearly the relationship between the political structure and behaviour, and how the two are part of a complex interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship in a dominant one-party regime. More importantly they do not reveal the dynamics of political self-censorship and the act of censoring others that are central to how this political culture manifests itself in material form. Thus other perspectives and ideas are needed to complement present understandings of how the system is constantly reproduced.
Culture is often treated as an abstract value system but it has its physical manifestation in people’s behaviour. The structural determination of a dominant Singaporean political culture and its material manifestation are significant. Censorship should not be understood in negative terms as an “absence” or failure in political life, of what is not done, but as an active material behaviour that itself shapes events in the real world. Censorship impacts on political structure and participation and is in turn constituted by these. Simply put, the current system is responsible for facilitating the censorial behaviour one witnesses in Singapore and such behaviour in return helps keep same the structure and fear in place. Each is necessary for the other.
In such an environment how does one think of political development or reform? What is the way forward? What strategies should one adopt?
In the next chapter, Singapore’s political history is briefly surveyed to trace the emergence and character of this dominant culture of self-censorship and the act of censoring others. It shows that it is mainly in contemporary Singapore that such a censorial climate emerged - a consequence of a systematic attempt by the PAP to contain alternative political expression.
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